In revenue maximization of selling a digital product in a social network, the utility of an agent is often considered to have two parts: a private valuation, and linearly additive influences from other agents. We study the incomplete information case where agents know a common distribution about others' private valuations, and make decisions simultaneously. The "rational behavior" of agents in this case is captured by the well-known Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Introduction
Social influence in large social networks provides huge monetization potential, which is under intensive investigation by companies as well as research communities. Many digital products exhibit explicit social values. For example, Zune players can share music with each other, so the utility one can expect from a Zune player partially depends on the number of her friends having the same product. In a more direct case of instant messaging, the utility for one user is critically determined by the number of her friends who use the same instant messenger. Therefore, how to design, market, and price products with external social values depends intimately on the understanding and utilization of social influence in social networks.
In this paper, we study the problem of selling a digital product to agents in a social network. To incorporate social influence, we assume each agent's utility of having the product is the summation of two parts: the private intrinsic valuation and the overall influence from her friends who also have the product. In this paper, we study the linear influence case, i.e., the overall influence is simply the summation of influence values from her friends who have the product.
Given such assumption, the purchasing decision of one agent is not solely made based on her own valuation, but also on information about her friends' purchasing decisions. However, a typical agent does not have complete information about others' private valuations, and thus might make the decision based on her belief of other agents' valuations.
In this paper, we study the case when this belief forms a public distribution, and rely on the solution concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium [Har67] . Specifically, each agent knows her own private valuation (also referred to as her type); in addition, there is a distribution of this private valuation, publicly known by everyone in the network as well as the seller. In this paper, we study the case that the joint distribution is a product distribution, and the valuations for all agents are sampled independently from possibly different uniform distributions.
Computing the Equilibria. Usually, there exist multiple equilibria in this game. We first study the case when all influences are non-negative. We show that there exist two special ones: the pessimistic equilibrium and the optimistic equilibrium, and all other equilibria are between these two. We then design a polynomial time algorithm to compute the pessimistic (resp. optimistic) equilibrium exactly.
The overall idea is to utilize the fact that the pessimistic (resp. optimistic) equilibrium is "monotonically increasing" when the price increases. However, the iterative method requires exponential number of steps to converge, just like many potential games which may well be PLS-hard. Our algorithm is based on the line sweep paradigms, by increasing the price p and computing the equilibrium on the way. There are several challenges we have to address to implement the line sweep algorithm. See Section 3.2 for more discussions on the difficulties.
On the negative side, when there exist negative influences among agents, the monotone property of the equilibria does not hold. In fact, we show that computing an approximate equilibrium is PPAD-hard for a given price, by a reduction from the two player Nash equilibrium problem.
Optimal Pricing Strategy. When the seller considers offering a uniform price, our proposed line sweep algorithm calculates the equilibrium as a function of the price. This closed form allows us to find the price for the optimal revenue.
We also discuss the extensions to discriminative pricing setting: agents are partitioned into k groups and the seller can offer different prices to different groups. Depending on whether the algorithm can choose the partition or not, we discuss the hardness and approximation algorithms of these extensions.
Related Work
Influence maximization. Cabral et al. [CSW99] studied the property of the optimal prices over time with network externality and strategic agents. They show that the seller might set a low introductory price to attract a critical mass of agents. Another notable body of work in computer science is the optimal seeding problem (e.g. Kempe et al. [KKT03] and Chen et al. [CWY09] ), in which a set of k seeds are selected to maximize the total influence according to some stochastic propagation model.
Pricing with equilibrium models. When there is social influence, a large stream of literature is focusing on simultaneous games. This is also known as the "two-stage" game where the seller sets the price in the first stage, and agents play a one-shot game in their purchasing decisions. Agents' rational behavior in this case is captured by the Nash equilibrium (or Bayesian Nash equilibrium if the information is incomplete).
The concept and existence of pessimistic and optimistic equilibria is not new. For instance, in analogous problems with externalities, Milgrom and Roberts [MR90] and Vives [Viv90] have witnessed the existence of such equilibria in the complete information setting. Notice that our pricing problem, when restricted to complete information, can be trivially solved by an iterative method.
In incomplete information setting, Vives and Van Zandt [VZV07] prove a similar existential result using iterative methods. However, they do not provide any convergence guarantee. In our setting, we have shown in Section 3.1 that such type of iterative methods may take exponential time to converge. Our proposed algorithm instead exactly computes the equilibrium, through a much move involved (but constructive) method. In parallel to this work, Sundararajan [Sun08] also discover the monotonicity of the equilibria, but for symmetry and limited knowledge of the structure (only the degree distribution is known).
It is worth noting that those works above do consider the case when influence is not linear (but for instance supermodular). Though our paper focuses on linear influences, our monotonicity results for equilibria do easily extend to non-linear ones. See Section 2.
When the influence is linear, Candogan, Bimpikis and Ozdaglar [CBO10] study the problem with (uniform) pricing model for a divisible good on sale. It differs from our paper in the model: they are in complete information and divisible good setting; more over, they have relied on a diagonal dominant assumption, which simplifies the problem and ensures the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Another paper for linear influence is by Bloch and Querou [BQ09] , which also studies the uniform pricing model. When the influence is small, they approximate the influence matrix by taking the first 3 layers of influence, and then an equilibrium can be easily computed. They also provide experiments to show that the approximation is numerically good for random inputs.
Pricing with cascading models. In contrast to the simultaneous-move game considered by us (and many others), another stream of work focuses on the cascading models with social influence.
Hartline, Mirrokni and Sundararajan [HMS08] study the explore and exploit framework. In their model the seller offers the product to the agents in a sequential manner, and assumes all agents are myopic, i.e., each agent is making the decision based on the known results of the previous agents in the sequence. As they have pointed out, if the pricing strategy of the seller and the private value distributions of the subsequent agents are publicly known, the agents can make more "informed" decisions than the myopic ones. In contrast to them, we consider "perfect rational" agents in the simultaneous-move game, where agents make decisions in anticipation of what others may do given their beliefs to other agents' valuations.
Arthur et al. [AMSX09] also use the explore and exploit framework, and study a similar problem; potential buyers do not arrive sequentially as in [HMS08] , but can choose to buy the product with some probability only if being recommended by friends.
Recently, Akhlaghpour et al. [AGH
+ 10] consider the multi-stage model that the seller sets different prices for each stage. In contrast to [HMS08] , within each stage, agents are "perfectly rational", which is characterized by the pessimistic equilibrium in our setting with complete information.
As mentioned in [AGH
+ 10], they did not consider the case where a rational agent may defer her decision to later stages in order to improve the utility.
Other works. If the value of the product does not exhibit social influence, the seller can maximize the revenue following the optimal auction process by the seminal work of Myerson [Mye81] . Truthful auction mechanisms have also been studied for digital goods, where one can achieve constant ratio of the profit with optimal fixed price [GHK + 06, HM05]. On computing equilibria for problems that guarantees to find an equilibrium through iterative methods, most of them, for instance the famous congestion game, is proved to be PLS-hard [FPT04] .
Model and Solution Concept
We consider the sale of one digital product by a seller with zero cost, to the set of agents V = [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} in a social network. The network is modeled as a simple directed graphs G = (V, E) with no self-loops.
• Valuation: Agent i has a private value v i ≥ 0 for the product. We assume v i is sampled from a uniform distribution with interval
The values a i and b i are common knowledge.
• Price: We consider the seller offering the product at a uniform price p. We postpone discriminative pricing models in Appendix C.2.
• Revenue: Let d = {d 1 , . . . , d n } ∈ {0, 1} n be the decision vector the agents make, i.e., d i = 1 if agent i buys the product and 0 otherwise. The revenue of the seller is defined as i p · d i . When the decisions are random variables, the revenue is defined as the expected payments received from the users.
• Influence: Let matrix T = (T j,i ) with T j,i ∈ R and i, j ∈ V represent the influences among agents, with T j,i = 0 for all (j, i) / ∈ E. In particular, T j,i is the utility that agent i receives from agent j, if both of them buy the product. Except for the hardness result, we consider T j,i to be non-negative.
• Utility: Let d −i be the decision vector of the agents other than agent i. For convenience, we denote d . In particular, given the influence matrix T, the utility is defined as: Our question is: "which price shall the seller offer to maximize the total revenue?" In order to answer this question, it is necessary to study the agents' rational behavior using the concept Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE). For ease of presentation, we redefine the equilibrium based on the buying probability of the agents. We will show that they are equivalent. Its proof is in Appendix A.
Definition 2.2. The probability vector q = (q 1 , q 2 , ..., q n ) ∈ [0, 1] n is an equilibrium at price p, if (where med is the median function) Equation 2 can be also defined in the language of a transfer function, which we will extensively reply on in the rest of the paper.
Definition 2.4 (Transfer function). Given price p, we define the transfer function
in which
Notice that q is an equilibrium at price p if and only f p (q) = q.
Using Brouwer fixed point theorem, the existence of BNE is not surprising, even when influences are negative. However, we will show in Appendix C.1 that computing BNE will be PPAD-hard with negative influences. We now define the pessimistic and optimistic equilibria (similar to e.g. Van Zandt and Vives [VZV07] ) based on the transfer function.
When all influences are non-negative, we define
We remark that both limits exist by monotonicity of f (see Fact 2.6 below), when all influences are non-negative. In addition, q(p) and q(p) are both equilibria themselves, because f p (q(p)) = q(p) and f p (q(p)) = q(p). We later show that q(p) and q(p) are the lower bound and upper bound for any equilibrium at price p respectively. Now we state some properties of equilibria, which we will use extensively later. Their proofs are in Appendix A.
For two vectors v 1 , v 2 ∈ R n , we write
Lemma 2.7. When all influences are non-negative, equilibria satisfy the following properties: a) For any equilibrium q at price p, we have q(p) ≤ q ≤ q(p).
b) Given price p, for any probability vector q ≤ q(p), we have f
In this paper, we consider the problem that whether we can exactly calculate the pessimistic (resp. optimistic) equilibrium, and whether we can maximize the revenue. The latter is formally defined as follows:
Definition 2.8 (Revenue maximization problem). Assume the value of agent i is sampled from U (a i , b i ) and the influence matrix T is given. The revenue maximization problem is to compute an optimal price with respect to the pessimistic equilibrium (resp. optimistic equilibrium ):
Notice that the optimal revenue with respect to the pessimistic equilibrium is robust against equilibrium selection. By Lemma 2.7(a), no matter which equilibrium the agents choose, this revenue is a minimal guarantee from the seller's perspective. The revenue guarantees for pessimistic and optimistic equilibria is an important objective to study; see for instance the price of anarchy and the price of stability in [NRTV07] for details.
The Main Algorithm
When all influences are non-negative, can we calculate q(p) and q(p) in polynomial time? We answer this question positively in this section by providing an efficient algorithm which computes the optimal revenue as well as the q(p) and q(p) for any price p.
A counter example for iterative method
Before coming to our efficient algorithm, notice that it is possible to iteratively apply the transfer function (Equation 3) to reach the equilibria by definition. However, this may require exponential number of steps to converge, as illustrated in the following example.
we can obtain that f
We proceed the calculation:
It can be seen from above that it takes Ω(2 n ) number of steps before we reach the fixed point.
Outline of our line sweep algorithm
We start to introduce our algorithm with the easy case where valuations of agents are fixed. Consider the pessimistic decision vector d(p) as a function of p. By monotonicity, there are at most O(n) different such vectors when p varies from +∞ to 0. In particular, at each price p, if we decrease p gradually to some threshold value, one more agent would change his decision to buy the product. Naturally, such kind of process can be casted in the "line sweep algorithm" paradigm.
When the private valuations of the agents are sampled from uniform distributions, the line sweep algorithm is much more complicated. We now introduce the algorithm to obtain the pessimistic equilibrium q(p), while the method to obtain q(p) is similar.
1 The essence of the line sweep algorithm is processing the events corresponding to some structural changes. We define the possible structures of a probability vector as follows.
Our line sweep algorithm is based on the following fact: when p is sufficiently large, obviously q(p) = 0; with the decreasing of p, at some point p = p 1 the pessimistic equilibrium q(p) becomes non-zero, and there exists some structural change at this moment. Due to the monotonicity of q(p) in Lemma 2.7, such structural changes can happen at most 2n times. (Each agent i can contribute to at most two changes: 0 → ⋆ and ⋆ → 1.) Therefore, there exist threshold prices p 1 > p 2 > · · · > p m for m ≤ 2n such that within two consecutive prices, the structure of the pessimistic equilibrium remains unchanged and q(p) is a linear function of p. This indicates that the total revenue, i.e., p · i [q(p)] i , and its maximum value is easy to obtain. If we can compute the threshold prices and the corresponding pessimistic equilibrium q(p) as a function of p, it will be straightforward to determine the optimal price p.
There are several difficulties to address in this line sweep algorithm.
• First, degeneracies, i.e., more than one structural changes in one event, are intrinsic in our problem. Unlike geometric problems where degeneracies can often be eliminated by perturbations, the degeneracies in our problem are persistent to small perturbations.
• Second, to deal with degeneracies, we need to identify the next structural change, which is related to the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of a linear operator. By a careful inspection, we avoid solving eigen systems so that our algorithm can be implemented by pure algebraic computations.
• Third, after the next change is identified, the usual method of pushing the sweeping line further does not work directly in our case. Instead, we recursively solve a subproblem and combine the solution of the subproblem with the current one to a global solution. The polynomial complexity of our algorithm is guaranteed by the monotonicity of the structures.
We first design a line sweep algorithm for the problem with a diagonal dominant condition, which will not contain degenerate cases, in Section 3.3. Then we describe techniques to deal with the unrestricted case in Section 3.4.
Diagonal dominant case
This condition has some natural interpretation on the buying behavior of the agents. It means that the decision of any agent cannot be solely determined by the decisions of her friends. In particular, the following two situations cannot occur simultaneously for any agent i and price p: a) agent i will not buy the product regardless of her own valuation when none of her friends bought the product(p ≥ b i ), and b) agent i will always buy the product regardless of her own valuation when all her friends bought the product ( j T j,i + a i ≥ p).
In our line sweep algorithm, we maintain a partition
, and name Z the zero set, W the working set and O the one set. This corresponds to the structure s ∈ {0, ⋆, 1} n as follows:
We use x W or [x] W to denote the restriction of vector x on set W , and for simplicity we write
Let L W ×W be the projection of matrix L to W × W , and f | W be the restriction of function f on W . We start from the price p = +∞ where the structure of the pessimistic equilibrium q(p) is s 0 = 0, i.e., Z = [n] and W = O = ∅. The first event happens when p drops to p 1 = max i b i and q(p) starts to become non-zero. Assume now we have reached threshold price p t , the current pessimistic equilibrium is q t = q(p t ), and the structure in interval (p t , p t−1 ) (or (p t , +∞) if t = 1) is s t−1 . We define
To analyze the pessimistic equilibrium in the next price interval, for price p = p t − ε where ε > 0, we write function g p (·) (recall Equation 3) as:
For p ∈ (p t , p t−1 ), let partition Z ∪W ∪O = [n] be consistent with the structure s t−1 . According to Def. 3.1 and the right continuity q t = lim p→pt+ q(p) (see Lemma 2.7d), we have
Step 1:
, move i from working set W to one set O. Notice that the structural changes we apply in Step 1 are exactly the changes defining the threshold price p t . We will see in a moment that after the process in Step 1, the new partition will be the next structure s t for p ∈ (p t+1 , p t ). In other words, there is no more structural change at price p t .
In the next two steps, we calculate the next threshold price p t+1 . For notation simplicity, we assume Z, W and O remain unchanged in these two steps. When p decreases by ε, we show that the probability vector of agents in W , [q(p)] W , increases linearly with respect to ε. (See r W (ε) below.) However, this linearity holds until we reach some point, where the next structural change takes place.
Step 2: Define the vector r(ε) ∈ R n , and let:
Clearly, r(ε) is linear to ε and we write r(ε) = εℓ + (x + Lq t ) where ℓ = ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 , . . . , ℓ n ∈ R n is the linear coefficient derived from Equation 6. When I − L is strictly diagonal dominant, the largest eigenvalue of L W ×W is smaller than 1. Using this property one can verify (see Lemma B.1) that ℓ is strictly positive.
Step 3:
Using the positiveness of vector ℓ one can verify that ε min > 0 (see Lemma B.1). We show that the next threshold price p t+1 = p t − ε min by the following lemma. The proof is in the Appendix B.
We remark here that the above lemma has confirmed that our structural adjustments in Step 1 are correct and complete. Now we let p t+1 = p t − ε min , q t+1 = 0 Z , r W (ε min ), 1 O . The next structural change will take place at p = p t+1 . This is because according to the definition of ε min (Equation 7), there must be some
One can see that in the next iteration, this i will move to one set O or working set W accordingly. Therefore, we can iteratively execute the above three steps by sweeping the price further down. For completeness, we attach the pseudocode in Algorithm 1 in Appendix B.
The return value of our constrained line sweep method is a function q which gives the pessimistic equilibrium for any price p ∈ R, and q(p) is a piecewise linear function of p with no more than 2n + 1 pieces. All three steps in our algorithm can be done in polynomial time. Since there are only O(n) threshold prices, we have the following result. 
General case
Let ρ(L) be the largest norm of the eigenvalues in matrix L. The ultimate reason for such degeneracies, is ρ(
W ×W ). We will prove shortly in such cases, those structural changes in Step 1 are incomplete, that is, as p sweeps across p t , at least one more structural change will take place. We derive a method to identify one pivot, i.e. an additional structural change, in polynomial time. Afterwards, we recursively solve a subproblem with set O taken out, and combine the solution from the subproblem with the current one. The follow lemma shows that whether ρ(L) < 1 can be determined efficiently. 
Finding the pivot.
When ρ(L W ×W ) < 1 for the new working set W , one can find the next threshold price p t+1 following
Step 2 and 3 in the previous subsection. Now, we deal with the case that ρ(L W ×W ) ≥ 1 by showing that there must exists some additional agent i ∈ W such that [q(p)] i = 1 for any p smaller than the current price. We call such agent a pivot.
Since ρ(L W ×W ) ≥ 1, we can always find a non-empty set W 1 ⊂ W and
The pair (W 1 , W 2 ) can be found by ordering the elements in W and add them to W 1 one by one. We now show that there is a pivot in W 2 .
As L W2×W2 is a non-negative matrix, based on Lemma B.2 there exists a non-zero eigenvector
Now we prove that k is a pivot. Intuitively, if we slightly increase the probability vector q t W2
by δu W2 , where δ is a small constant, by performing the transfer function only on agents in W m times, their probability will increase by δ(1 + λ + .. + λ m )u W2 , while λ ≥ 1. Therefore, after performing the transfer function sufficiently many times, agent k ∈ W 2 's probability will hit 1 first.
We remark that if we can exactly estimate the eigenvector (which may be irrational), then the above lemma has already determined that the k defined in Equation 8 is a pivot. To avoid the eigenvalue computation, we find a quasi-eigenvector u in the following manner.
The meaning of the above vector is as follows. If we raise agent w's probability by δ, those probabilities of agents in W 1 increase proportionally to L W1×{w} δ. Assuming that we ignore the probability changes outside W 2 (which will even increase the probabilities in W 2 ), the probability of agents in W 1 will eventually converge to
We will see that the real probability vector increases at least "as much as if we increase in the direction of u". In other words, we pick a pivot in the same way as Equation 8. The following is the critical lemma to support our result.
Lemma 3.7. Given the definition of u in Equation 9 and k using Equation 8, we have ∀ε
> 0, [q(p t − ε)] k = 1.
Recursion on the subproblem.
, and we consider a subproblem with n ′ = n − |O ′ | < n agents, where k is the pivot identified in the previous section. This subproblem is a projection of the original one, assuming that the agents in O ′ always tend to buy the product.
By recursively solving this new instance, we can solve the pessimistic equilibrium of the subproblem for any given price p. This recursive procedure will eventually terminate because every invocation reduces the number of agents by at least 1. The following lemma tells us that for any p < p t , the pessimistic equilibrium of the original problem and the subproblem are one-to-one.
Lemma 3.8. Let q ′ (p) be the pessimistic equilibrium function in the subproblem. We have:
At this moment we have solved the pessimistic equilibrium q(p) for p < p t , and thus solved the original problem. We summarize our unrestricted line sweep method in Algorithm 2 in Appendix B for completeness. Again q(p) is a piecewise linear function of p with no more than 2n + 1 pieces.
Theorem 3.9. For matrix T satisfying T i,i = 0 and T i,j ≥ 0, in polynomial time Algorithm 2 is able to calculate the pessimistic equilibrium q(p) (resp. q(p)) at any price p, along with the optimal p that ensures the maximal revenue under the pessimistic equilibrium (resp. the optimistic equilibrium).
Extensions
We discuss some possible extensions of our model in this section with both positive and negative influences. When the influence values can be negative, it is actually PPAD-hard to compute an approximate equilibrium. We define a probability vector q to be an ε-approximate equilibrium for price p if:
where q
We have the following theorem, whose proof is deferred to Appendix C.1.
Theorem 4.1. It is PPAD-hard to compute an n
−c -approximate equilibrium of our pricing system for any c > 1 when influences can be negative.
In discriminative pricing setting, we study the revenue maximization problem in two natural models. We assume the agents are partitioned into k groups. The seller can offer different prices to different groups. The first model we consider is the fixed partition model, i.e., the partition is predefined. In the second model, we allow the seller to partition the agents into k groups and offer prices to the groups respectively. We have the following two theorems, whose proofs are deferred to Appendix C.2.
Theorem 4.2. There is an FPTAS for the discriminative pricing problem in the fixed partition case with constant k.

Theorem 4.3. It is NP-hard to compute the optimal pessimistic discriminative pricing equilibrium in the choosing partition case.
Appendix
A Missing Proofs in Section 2
Before proving Lemma 2.3, let us recall the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) from the economics literature (see e.g. Chapter 8 of [MCWG95] ). Formally, in a Bayesian game, each agent has a private type v i ∈ Ω i , where Ω i is the set of all possible types of agent i. Let S i be the action space for agent i. Slightly abusing the notation, we define the (pure) strategy of agent i as a function d i : Ω i → S i . The utility of agent i when the type configuration v is known is
is the joint actions of all agents other than i. Define the expected utility of agent i as:
where the expectation is taking over all type configurations of the agents. 
In our setting, Ω i is the set of private values of agent i and d i (·) maps a particular value v i to {0, 1}. The utility of agent i is given in Equation 1. Notice that mixed strategies are almost irrelevant here, because while fixing other agent's private valuations, agent i's strategy is a simple choice between to buy or not to buy. Unless the utility function u i (S, p) = 0, there is always a unique better choice for her.
For ease of presentation, we redefine the equilibrium based on the buying probability of the agents and show that they are equivalent.
Lemma 2.3 (restated). Given equilibrium q (recall Def. 2.2), the strategy profile such agent i "buys the product if and only if her internal valuation
v i ≥ p − j =i T j,i q j "
is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium; on the contrary, if a strategy profile is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then the probability that agent i buys the product satisfies Equation 2.
Proof. Let strategy profile d(·) = (d 1 (·), d 2 (·), ..., d n (·)) be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and q i = Pr vi [d i (v i ) = 1] be the probability that agent i buys the product under this profile. In our setting, the utility of agent i is defined by Equation 1. Now we calculate the expected utility of agent i:
To satisfy the condition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we must have that ∀d
). This means, d i (v i ) must be 1 whenever v i − p + j =i T j,i q j is positive, and 0 whenever it is negative 2 . Therefore,
On the contrary, the strategy that agent i "buys whenever v i ≥ p − j =i T j,i q j " can be denoted
where I is the indicator function. This obviously maximizes Equation 11, and is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 2.7 (restated). Equilibria satisfy the following properties:
a) For any equilibrium q at price p, we have q(p) ≤ q ≤ q(p). b) Given price p, for any probability vector q ≤ q(p), we have f
Proof.
a) By the definition of equilibrium, q = f p (q) = f (∞) p (q). Next according to 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 and the monotonicity of f p , we derive that:
b) By symmetry we only need to prove the first half. We already know that f p (q(p)) = q(p), then recall the monotonicity of
Notice that the last "⇒" is due to f c) This time we use the combined monotonicity of the function f (Fact 2.6)
For similar reason we also have q(p 1 ) ≥ q(p 2 ). d) We only prove the first half while the property of q(p) can be obtained in similar way. We first claim that for any fixed m, f p+ε (0)} m≥1 that converge to q(p + ε). This contradiction completes the proof. We remark here that the left continuity does not hold, see the beginning of Section 3.4.
B Missing Proofs in Section 3
Before proving Lemma 3.3, we first show Equation 7 is well defined.
Lemma B.1. ℓ ∈ R n + and ε min > 0. Proof. When I − L is strictly diagonal dominant, the largest eigenvalue of L W ×W is smaller than 1. By the knowledge from complex analysis, the following limit exists
W ×W + · · · and it is a non-negative matrix since L is non-negative. Now, y is strictly positive and therefore
and therefore ℓ ∈ R n + . Finally, by our Step 1, we have [x + Lq t ] i < 0 for i ∈ Z, and [x + Lq t ] j < 1 for j ∈ W . Therefore, ε min > 0 is properly defined.
Proof. We first show that q = 0 Z , r W (ε), 1 O is an equilibrium for ε ∈ (0, ε min ]. By our definition of ε min , when 0 < ε ≤ ε min we must have
Since f pt−ε = med{0, 1, g pt−ε } (Def. 2.4), it must be the case that f pt−ε (q) = q, i.e., q is an equilibrium. Next we lower bound the pessimistic equilibrium by q(p t − ε) ≥ q. This will be sufficient to complete the proof following from Lemma 2.7a.
, where the second equality is because:
For the simplicity of notation, we define x
O as a constant vector, and according to the definition of an equilibrium:
After repeated use of the monotonicity of transfer function f , we make the following analysis 3 :
The last inequality in Equation 12 implies that
The following lemma in matrix analysis is important for our analysis.
Lemma B.2 ([HJ90]). Given a non-negative matrix M (i.e. ∀i, j, M ij ≥ 0), there exists a nonnegative (and non-zero) eigenvector
x ≥ 0 satisfying M x = λx, in which λ = ρ(M ) is a real number.
Lemma 3.5 (restated). Given non-negative matrix M , if I − M is reversible and (I
Proof. For the first half, assume the contrary that ρ(M ) ≥ 1. According to Lemma B.2, there exists a non-negative x s.t.
−1 is non-negative, multiply a non-positive vector (I − M )x to its right is also non-positive: (I − M ) −1 (I − M )x ≤ 0. But the last inequality means that x ≤ 0 which contradicts the result in Lemma B.2 saying x is a non-negative and non-zero eigenvector.
For the second half, if I − M is degenerate then (I − M )x = 0 has a non-zero solution, which implies M x = x and ρ(M ) ≥ 1. Assume the contrary that ρ(M ) < 1, then (I − M ) −1 = I + M + M 2 + ... is non-negative as M is non-negative, resulting in a contradiction.
Lemma 3.6 (restated). For any
Proof. We will only prove the statement when W 2 = W , as the analysis for W 2 = W is similar.
3 within which we implicitly adopted the following property:
7:
for all i ∈ Z s.t.
end for 12:
end for 15:
16:
17:
{See Equation 7} 18:
t ← t + 1; 21: end while 22: q(p)| (−∞,pt) ← 1; 23: return q;
As L W ×W is a non-negative matrix, based on Lemma B.2 there exists a non-zero eigenvector
Since u = 0, the above equation is well defined. As q t i < 1 for any i ∈ W in the current configuration, we also have
The tie is broken arbitrarily. Since y > 0 and u ≥ 0, for any ε > 0, there exists δ > 0 satisfying δu ≤ εy. Because δ can be arbitrary small, let δ =
in which m is sufficiently large to satisfy the above constraint. For any probability vector q,
Starting from q t ≥ q t , we continue to apply the left side by f pt−ε and the right side by h, we derive the followings:
From our selection of k, we know that
This completes the proof of the existence of pivot k.
Lemma 3.7 (restated). Given the definition of u in Equation 9 and k using Equation 8, we have ∀ε
Proof. We only prove the case when Z = O = W \ W 2 = ∅, and will briefly describe how our proof can be extended to the general case. We use q −w to denote q [n]\{w} = q W1 .
We know that if we increase from q t in the direction of u, we can at most raise δu until agent k's probability hits 1. For a fixed ε > 0, let q ′ = q(p t − ε) be the pessimistic equilibrium. To prove q ′ k = 1 we consider two cases:
This means that in the real scenario, agent w indeed increases her probability by at least δ. It can be verified that in this case, the rest of the agents in W 1 = [n] \ {w} have to increase by at least δu −w . In other words, q ′ − q t ≥ δu which already implies q ′ k ≥ 1 by our definition of k and δ.
• q ′ w < q t w + δ. In this case, the actual final probability of w is small. Let δ ′ = q ′ w − q t w < δ. We start from the inequality q
By applying the transfer function f pt−ε to both sides and using the monotonicity,
. By applying the transfer function again we have
We continue to replace σ 2 by δ ′ and apply the transfer function. Doing this iteratively while assuming that ε is sufficiently small, we have:
Recall the definition of u we can rewrite the above equation as:
When ε is sufficiently small, we also have that the left hand side in the above equation is smaller than 1, and this proves that q ′ < 1 when ε is small, which contradicts Lemma 3.6 which says that the pivot always exists.
We describe how we prove the general case where Z, W \ W 2 and O are not necessarily empty. Imagine a subproblem with only |W 2 | rational players, while for agent i ∈ [n] \ W 1 , her probability is fixed to q Algorithm 2 LineSweepMethod(n, T, a, b) Input: n, T, a, b. Output: The pessimistic equilibrium function q : p → q(p).
1:
end for
15:
if ρ(L W ×W ) < 1 then 16:
else {|W | ≥ 2}
21:
Assume W = {w 1 , w 2 , ...w |W | };
22:
for i ← 2 to |W | do 23:
if ρ(L W2×W2 ) ≥ 1 then 25:
{See Equation 9}
26:
27:
29: In this section, we show that when the influence values can be negative, it is PPAD-hard to compute an approximate equilibrium. We define a probability vector q to be an ε-approximate equilibrium for price p if:
}. We prove the PPAD hardness by a reduction from the two player Nash equilibrium computation. Our construction is inspired by [CT11] . Let matrices A, B ∈ R n×n be the payoff matrices of the two players respectively, i.e. (A i ) j (resp. (B i ) j ) is the payoff for the first player (resp. the second player) when the first player plays its i-th strategy and the second player plays its j-th strategy. It is PPAD-hard to approximate the two player Nash Equilibrium with error 1/n α for any constant α > 0 [CDT09] . We build an instance of our pricing problem as follows. (δ is a small value to be determined later.)
• Price p = 1/2.
• User X i with value interval [0, 1] for i ∈ [n]. The probability that X i buys the product is x i .
• User Y i with value interval [0, 1] for i ∈ [n]. The probability that Y i buys the product is y i .
• User U i,j , i, j ∈ [n] is used to enforce x i = 0, when
• User V i,j , i, j ∈ [n] is used to enforce y i = 0 when
• For i, j ∈ [n], influence values on edges (U i,j , X i ) and (V i,j , Y i ) are −1.
• All other pair-wise influence values are zero.
In our setting, if U i,j buys the product, it will provide influence of −1 to X i , which will imply the probability that X i will buy the product is 0.
Theorem 4.1 (restated). It is PPAD-hard to compute an n −c -approximate equilibrium of our pricing system for any c > 1 when influences can be negative.
Proof. Let δ = n −c . Consider the instance we constructed above. Let x, y, u, v be the set of vectors that form an δ-approximate equilibrium of our pricing instance. We will show that we can construct an O(n 1−c ) approximate Nash equilibrium for the two player game. To simply the notation, we define x ± y = [x − y, x + y]. In particular, we have
For the purpose of controlling normalization, we first prove that ||x|| ∞ = ||y|| ∞ ∈ 1/2 ± δ. It is clear that ||x|| ∞ ≤ 1/2 + δ, since X i receives no positive influence in our construction. Furthermore, for any vector y, let t = arg max i∈[n] {A i y T }. Then for each U t,j , the sum of influence is (A j − A t )y T ≤ 0. As a result, U t,j will never buy the product and give a negative influence to X t , which implies ||x|| ∞ ≥ x t ≥ 1/2 − δ. The proof of ||y|| ∞ ∈ 1/2 ± δ is similar. We can define
Similarly, we obtain y ′ . We then normalize them to
It is sufficient to prove that x * and y * form an 9nδ-approximate Nash for the two player game. In particular, we shall show Theorem 4.1 implies that computing an exact equilibrium in our pricing system is PPAD-hard, when the price is given and the influence could be negative.
C.2 Discriminative pricing model
In this section, we discuss the extension of our problem in the discriminative pricing model, in which different agents may be offered with different prices to the same good, and there are at most k different prices offered. We only consider non-negative influences in this section. Let G be a kpartition of agent set [n] and g i denote the group which agent i belongs to. Let p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p k ) be the price vector corresponding to the k groups in the partition. Def. 2.2, Def. 2.4, and Def. 2.5 for a single price p can be straightforwardly extended to the case of price vector p with partition G, and we omit their re-definitions here. We define the revenue maximization problem under the discriminative pricing model as follows. Apparently, the uniform pricing case is a special case of discriminative model when k = 1. In this section, we discuss two different cases in this model: the fixed partition case and the choosing partition case. As the name suggests, in the fixed partition case, the partition of the agents are given. On the other hand, in the choosing partition case, the algorithm has the flexibility to choose the partition.
final price of optimal solution must be 1, so the revenue is equal to |V ′ − F |. Firstly, we show that r opt ≥ |V | − |C|. If given a minimum vertex cover C for G, we can define F according to C. It means the seller will give the free product to the vertex in A if it represent a vertex in minimum cover C. By the definition of vertex covering, all the vertexes in D , which represents the all edges in original graph G, will be activated and their value will all reach to 1. As a result, the value of all vertexes in A will also reach to 1 and will buy the product. Conclusively, our revenue will reach to |V ′ | − |C|. At last, we will prove r opt ≤ |V ′ | − |C|. Suppose r opt > |V ′ | − |C|, there must be a free set F to achieve the maximum revenue r opt . Consider the structure of F , if F ∩ M is not empty, we can eliminate these vertexes to get a better revenue. If F ∩ D is not empty, each point d ∈ F ∩ D can be replaced by the vertex in A which have an edge to it. This replacement never decreases our revenue because the new vertex have a 1-weight edge to the old vertex. So there must be a F ⊆ A, which could make the revenue greater than |V ′ | − |C|. By the construction, we can convert F to a vertex cover in G. This is a contradiction to the definition of minimum vertex cover.
D Counter Example in Appendix C.2
Assume n is even. Let p 1 be the price offered to agents {1, 3, . . . , n − 1} and p 2 be the price offered to {2, 4, . . . , n}. The influences are defined as T j,i = 2 ⌈j/2−1⌉ for i < j and j − i is odd and greater than 0, and 0 otherwise. The valuation of agent i is 2 ⌈i/2−1⌉ . There are a total of 2 Ω(n) structures for the pessimistic equilibrium as p 1 and p 2 vary in [0, +∞).
Proof. We prove the following stronger statement by induction: for all prices p 1 ∈ (0, 2 n/2 ) and p 2 ∈ (0, 2 n/2 ), there are at least 2 n/2 structures. Consider the base case of n = 2, with agent 1 and 2. Since there is no influence among them, the number of structure configuration is certainly 4 > 2, with the price range p 1 ∈ (0, 2), p 2 ∈ (0, 2). Suppose the statement is true for n = 2i. For the case of n = 2(i + 1), there are two additional agents 2i + 1 and 2i + 2.
Consider the price range p 1 ∈ (2 i , 2 i+1 ), p 2 ∈ (0, 2 i ). Agent 2i + 1 will not buy the product while agent 2i + 2 does in this case. Since the influence from agent 2i + 2 to every agent with price p 1 is 2 i except 2i + 1, the "effective price" for all odd agents except 2i + 1 is p 1 − 2 i ∈ (0, 2 i ). In such price range, there are at least 2 i structures by induction. Symmetrically, the same conclusion holds for price range p 1 ∈ (0, 2 i ), p 2 ∈ (2 i , 2 i+1 ). Notice these two price ranges have difference configuration for agents 2i + 1 and 2i + 2. Therefore, in total there are at least 2 · 2 i = 2 i+1 structures.
